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Abstract
This paper considers the impact of di¤erences in endogenous technological change
between two countries on global pollution emissions under international strategic
interaction in environmental policies. A country that initially has a dirty tech-
nology (an environmentally lagging country) reduces more pollution emissions by
imposing a higher rate of pollution reduction per unit of the emission, although
it may generate larger total emissions. The more a country reduces pollutants,
the more it learns how to produce in an environmentally friendly manner at low
cost. The main nding is that an environmentally lagging countrys technology
may continue to advance through a learning-by-doing e¤ect until it exceeds the
environmental friendliness of a leading country that initially had the cleanest tech-
nology. Whether a country eventually becomes an environmentally leading country
depends on the country size and its awareness of environmental quality.
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1 Introduction
A strengthening of environmental regulations that are intended to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions often induces environmentally friendly technological progress as a by-product
(Newell et al. 1999, Popp 2002).1 While technological progress itself is good for the
environment, it might ultimately increase the total pollution emissions in the world by
triggering international interactions on environmental regulations such as so-called carbon
leakage. Carbon leakage refers to the situation in which a reduction in carbon dioxide
emissions by the home country with a strict climate policy causes an emissions increase
in the foreign country that weakens its environmental restriction as a response, which
might not only increase the total emissions in the short run but also slow the pace of
climate policy-driven technological progress in the foreign country. As a result, the total
emissions in the international economy might be higher also in the long run.
The present paper proposes a new two-country model that explicitly captures such
an international and intertemporal interaction between environmental regulations that
governs technological progress. We examine consequences of technological progress on
pollution emissions in each country and the world.
For this purpose, we develop a two-country model in which the government in each
country determines domestic environmental regulations and the rms respond to it by
determining the scale of pollution reduction. There is a unique nal good that generates
transboundary pollution (greenhouse gas) as a by-product of production. In order to
mitigate pollution damage, the national government requires each domestic rm to reduce
its emissions, which induces environmentally friendly technological progress according to
the nding by Newell et al. (1999) and Popp (2002). We follow Arrow (1962) and Romer
(1986) by assuming technological progress results from learning by doing, which takes
place as a by-product of the rmsexperiences on emission reduction.
A key mechanism in our model is that an environmental policy in one country induces
domestic rmsadoption of cleaner technologies, which may discourage the other coun-
trys incentive for a stricter environmental policy. A less strict environmental policy in
the other country should stie the process of technological progress through learning by
doing. In other words, the strategic interaction between countries might hamper long-
term technological progress, which has a negative impact on the environment. To the best
of our knowledge, this mechanism of international strategic interaction on environmental
regulations is new to the literature on the environment and endogenous technological
progress. The present paper could complement the existing studies by o¤ering a new
model incorporating that mechanism.
Using the model, we demonstrate that environmental leadership of a country may
shift to the other along an equilibrium path.2 Environmental leadership is dened as the
state whereby a country has the most environmentally friendly technology on pollution
emissions. The intuition is the following. As each country is assumed to regulate its
emissions to maximize individual welfare, a country that initially has a dirty technology
(an environmentally lagging country) needs to reduce more pollution emissions. The en-
vironmentally lagging country tends to impose a higher rate of pollution reduction per
1More environmentally friendly technologies are widely recognized as a key component of the long-
term strategy to mitigate global greenhouse gas emissions without compromising economic growth. As
is well known, in order to control and limit climate change, long-term greenhouse gas emissions need
to be reduced. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2012) and
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2014).
2This theoretical result seems consistent with empirical observations; see Section 4.2.
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unit of the emission and reduce more pollution emissions, although it may generate a
large amount of pollution emissions (i.e., implementing a weak environmental regulation
in terms of emissions per unit of the good). This is realized as a result of international
strategic interaction emerging in Nash equilibrium of the policy game. Consequently,
learning-by-doing e¤ects are large in the lagging country and its technology becomes en-
vironmentally friendly more rapidly than the other country that initially had a clean tech-
nology (an environmentally leading country). Thus, the lagging countrys environmental
friendliness may continue to increase until it exceeds the leading countrys environmen-
tal friendliness. Each countrys friendliness converges to a certain level in the long run
because the government ceases to implement environmental regulations when its tech-
nology is su¢ ciently clean. We can show that whether a country eventually becomes an
environmentally leading country depends on country size and awareness of environmental
quality.
The result that the leadership may endogenously uctuate is not new in the context of
price competition between rms. For instance, the important paper by Giovannetti (2001)
considers a duopoly in which rms considering innite technological adoption set prices
with Bertrand competition in the product market. Using this model, Giovannetti iden-
ties the conditions whereby rms alternate in adopting the new technology. He shows
that demand conditions, such as price elasticities, play a role in determining whether
such leapfrogging can be perpetual in Bertrand competition.3 In addition, some studies
in the eld of economic geography address both the theory of and empirical evidence
for the possibility of leadership reversals between regions (for example, Quah 1996a, b).4
Di¤erent from the context of price competition, the present paper assumes that rms are
perfectly competitive as in the standard endogenous growth model based on learning by
doing (Romer 1986). Thus, there is no strategic interaction between rms but between
international governments.5
Another result we obtain from the model is that whether global pollution emissions
decrease over time is ambiguous, despite the fact that environmental technology monoton-
ically advances in both countries. More specically, the amount of global pollution emis-
sions converges to a constant level in the long run, which may be lower (higher) than the
initial level of global emissions (i.e., the level in an early stage of adjustment under dirty
technologies) when environmental leadership shifts between countries (does not shift) on
an equilibrium path. In our model, the technology in the lagging country advances more
rapidly than that in the leading country. This feature implies that technologies in the
two countries advance considerably if both countries experience a state of environmental
lagging for many periods. That is, both countries possess similarly clean technologies
when the environmental leadership shifts internationally. This is why the long-term level
of global pollution can become low in the case of leadership reversals.
Our results could suggest the importance of balanced technological change, while it
should be safe to keep in mind that we are only seeing the learning-by-doing aspect of
technological progress. Most of the worlds technological progress for the environment
occurs in high-income countries (e.g., Lanjouw and Mody, 1996). Dechezleprêtre et al.
3See Athreye and Godley (2009), Giovannetti (2013), and Petrakos, Rodríguez-Pose, and Rovolis
(2005) for more recent research.
4Some papers in trade theory also address similar issues to this. See Furukawa (2015) for recent
research.
5See, for example, Hall (2008) and Harrington, Iskhakov, Rust, and Schjerning (2010) for research on
dynamic strategic interaction between rms in the competitive process.
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(2011) did nd climate-friendly innovations in emerging economies, but these innovations
are limited. While international transfers of climate-mitigation technologies occur mostly
between developed countries, technology transfers from developed countries to emerging
countries are few in number, but have been rising rapidly in recent years.6 We might
need to accelerate international transfers to mitigate the imbalanced technological change
between countries that could cause undesirable e¤ects on the environment.
By developing a two-country model of endogenous environmental regulations and
learning by doing, this paper complements the literature on environmental regulations
and endogenous technological change through research and development (R&D). Boven-
berg and Smulders (1996) examined the link between tighter environmental policy and
economic growth when the environmental R&D sector endogenously develops abatement
technologies. Goulder and Mathai (2000) explored policy-induced technological change
for the design of carbon-abatement policies when the channels of technological progress
are based on R&D and learning-by-doing. Acemoglu et al. (2012) considered whether
research can be directed to improving the productivity of clean and dirty intermedi-
ate goods sectors and showed that sustainable long-run growth can be achieved with
temporary taxation of dirty innovation and production when the inputs are su¢ ciently
substitutable. None of these studies developed a two-country model to study the strategic
interaction of environmental policies between countries and its e¤ects on technological
progress and global pollution.7
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our two-country
model of environmental regulations and Section 3 considers a Nash equilibrium of the
policy game. Section 4 explores each countrys environmental leadership in equilibrium.
Section 5 investigates global pollution emissions. Section 6 concludes.
2 Basic Model
There are two countries, labeled by i = A; B: In the basic model, we keep the two countries
as symmetric as possible. They di¤er only in initial environmental technological levels.8
There is a single consumption good, which is taken as the numeraire. The consumption
good is produced by perfectly competitive rms in both countries. There are constant
returns to scale, and the technology converts one unit of (e¤ective) labor into one unit
of a good. The (gross) marginal cost in country i is thus equal to the wage rate, denoted
as wi: In the present model, time is discrete extending from t = 0 to 1: Nevertheless, to
simplify notation, we will drop the time index t, when it causes no confusion.
Industrial production emits pollution, which is treated as a global pure public bad.
Assume that producing one unit of a good in country i generates i > 0 units of pollution.
The variable i captures how harmful the production technology in country i is to the
environment. We model a countrys environmental technology by using i, which may
correspond to the amount of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions per unit of GDP adjusted by
6Popp (2012) provided a comprehensive review of the literature on environmentally friendly techno-
logical change and technology transfers.
7In the literature on trade and the environment, the interaction of environmental policy interventions
is investigated using a two-country model, but technologies are exogenously given to focus on the e¤ects
of trade liberalization. See, e.g., Copeland and Taylor (2004). Those studies focused on the interaction
of environmental polices between countries but not on technological change.
8In Section 4.3, we will investigate the roles of heterogeneity between the countries.
4
PPP in a commonly-used data set of the United Nations (the Millennium Development
Goals (MDG) Indicators), given that we think of a single-good model.
In this paper, we use two di¤erent words concerning the environment. The rst word
is awareness,to which we relate parameter ": This captures how uncomfortable people
feel about global pollutants. The second word is friendliness, inversely relating to i:
This captures to what extent the production technology of a country generates pollution
emissions.
In this study, we highlight the governments role in controlling emissions. In order
to control the aggregate emission level, the national government of country i requires
each domestic rm to reduce its pollution by 100  i %: In other words, rms in country
i are allowed to generate i(1    i) of emissions for one unit of the good. We assume
that every rm can reduce one unit of emission by hiring one unit of (e¤ective) labor.
The e¤ective marginal cost for a rm to produce a unit of a good (with the inclusion of
pollution reduction) is equal to wi(1 + i i): We may refer to  i 2 [0; 1] as the rate of
pollution reduction per unit of the emission in country i:9
In each country, there is a representative consumer who inelastically supplies L=2
units of (e¤ective) labor. The consumer in country i consumes Ci units of the single
consumption good and is endowed with the following utility function:
ui = Ci   " (EA + EB)2 ; (1)
where Ei is the ow of pollution emission generated by country i and " > 0 denotes the
degree of environmental awareness.
We treat pollution as a ow although most environmental problems are stock ones.
The reason is as follows. First, if the depreciation rate of the pollution stock is high (e.g.,
the natural rate of removal of atmospheric pollution is high), the ow assumption may
be a reasonable approximation (e.g., Schou, 2002; Grimaud and Tournemaine, 2007).
Second, it simplies the analysis without altering the main insight of our paper.
3 Equilibrium in a Two-country Model
In this section, we will characterize the short-run equilibrium of our model under given
environmental technologies. Although our model is very simple, its equilibrium behavior
appears to be complex because of strategic interaction between countries. To explain this,
rst, we will see the consumersand rmsoptimal activities in market equilibrium. Then,
we will characterize the governmentsoptimal environmental policy in a Nash equilibrium
of the policy game played by the two countries.
3.1 Market Equilibrium
Assuming that rms of the two countries supply their products to the integrated world
market, the e¤ective marginal costs must be equated between the two countries. Thus
we have wA (1 + AA) = wB (1 + BB) = 1: The equilibrium wages are obtained as
wi =
1
1 + i i
: (2)
9We can interpret that i represents how clean the production process itself is and  i indicates how
much of pollution emissions generated from production is reduced by abatement technology (e.g., air
and water treatment lters, catalytic converters, and carbon capture and storage).
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The labor market equilibrium conditions determine the equilibrium levels of national
output equal to
Yi =
L=2
1 + i i
: (3)
We thus obtain the indirect utility function as
ui =
L=2
1 + i i
  "
0@ X
i2fA;Bg
Ei
1A2 ; (4)
where the pollution is given by
Ei = (1   i) Li=2
1 + i i
(5)
for i = A and B:
3.2 Optimal Policy Equilibrium
The government in each country, say i; controls their pollution reduction rate  i as an
environmental policy tool so as to maximize utility, given their foreign policy  j: A reac-
tion function is dened as  i (

j) = argmax i2[0;1] ui: Solving this nonlinear optimization
problem with (4) derives the reaction function as
 i (

j) =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 if "L  1
1+i

i +
j(1 j)
1+jj
 1
ei otherwise
1 if "L  1
1+i

j(1 j)
1+jj
 1 ; (6)
where
ei =
"L  1
i

1
1+i
  j(1 

j)
1+jj
"L

"L+

1
1+i
  j(1 

j)
1+jj
"L
 : (7)
Equation (6) suggests a possibility of so-called carbon leakage. Since  i (

j) is globally
a decreasing function in  j ; one country would prefer a lower rate of pollution reduction
when the other country takes a higher pollution reduction rate. Thus, it is less likely for
both countries to take a very high rate of reduction at the same time. At the aggregate
level, this would imply the possibility of carbon leakage.
Next let us think of a Nash equilibrium in the policy game played between the two
governments. Denote as ( A; 

B) a pair of strategies taken in the Nash equilibrium.
This equilibrium pair of policies can be calculated as a solution to the system consisting
of the two optimal policy equations:  A = 

A(

B) and 

B = 

B(

A): To derive the
equilibrium policies, rst, it is useful to note two basic facts. First, ( A; 

B) = (1; 1)
and ( A; 

B) = (eA; eB) cannot be Nash equilibria.
10 Second, if the world pollution level
10The proof is as follows. Substituting ej into ei results in

i
i
+ 1

i
2"(1+i)
  j2"(1+j)

= 0: This
does not hold in general because i > 0:
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A + B is su¢ ciently low, both countries do not adopt any pollution reduction policy:
( A; 

B) = (0; 0) if A + B < min
i2fA;Bg

1
"L (1 + i)

: (8)
By using (6) and (7), we can easily obtain the equilibrium pair of the policy in the
following; see Appendix A for detailed derivations. Dene ^ such that ^ = 1=("L (1 + ^)).
With i 6= j; the policy pair is characterized by
( i ; 

j) =
8>>><>>>:
(pi; 0) if
min
n
i;
1
"L(1+i)
o
> j  1"L(1+i)   i
(1; 0) if ^ > j > 1"L(1+i)
(1; qj) if i > j  ^
; (9)
where we dene two functions in t; pi and qj; that satisfy 0 < qi < pj < 1: Formal
denitions of these two functions are
pi 
"L  1
i

1
1+i
 "Lj

"L+

1
1+i
 "Lj
 and qj  "L 
1
j
1
1+j
"L+ 1
1+j
: (10)
By using (8) and (9) with (10), Figure 1 relates the environmental technologies of
both countries, (A; B); to their equilibrium pollution reduction rates, ( A; 

B); in (8)
and (9). These complex equations and gures simply imply that the country that has a
dirtier technology (larger i) is more willing to impose a higher rate of pollution reduction
per unit of the emission (larger  i). We can formally prove our main result.
Theorem 1 A country with a less environmentally friendly technology tends to imple-
ment a higher rate of pollution reduction per unit of the emission generated in the country
in equilibrium;  i   j if i > j:
Theorem 1 implies that the government of a country with dirtier technologies would
prefer to reduce more pollutants in percentage terms. This results from international
strategic interactions emerging in a Nash equilibrium of the policy game. This will
deliver the results on environmental leadership and global pollution as shown in the next
two sections.
One may think that the implication of Theorem 1 seems inconsistent with recent
empirical literature showing that new technologies lower the cost of regulation and in-
crease the willingness to regulate (e.g., Carrion-Flores and Innes, 2010; Lovely and Popp,
2011). However, we believe that these two seemingly opposite views are not necessarily
inconsistent but just seeing two di¤erent aspects of environmental technology. On the
one hand, the empirical literature focuses on a cost reduction of environmental regulation
driven by new technologies, which encourages the willingness to regulate as shown. On
the other hand, we are currently seeing new technologies to reduce the potential amount
of pollution emissions, which can be expressed by a decrease in i: The reduction of po-
tential pollution directly decreases the need to regulate itself, which would subsequently
weaken the willingness for a country to regulate pollution emissions. Our model captures
this aspect of environmental technology, which is essentially consistent with the way the
empirical literature considers.
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Note that the amount of pollution emissions per unit of the good within a country,
i, i.e., i (1   i ) ; can be greater when the technology of country i is dirtier (less envi-
ronmentally friendly), i.e., i is higher, although it is accompanied by a higher reduction
rate  i per unit of the emission. This suggests that, in our model, a country with a less
environmentally friendly technology tends to implement a weaker environmental regula-
tion in terms of emissions per unit of the good, which is consistent with the empirical
literature mentioned above.
4 Technological Leadership in the Environment
In this section, we will introduce a learning-by-doing process through which the environ-
mental technology in either country advances. To begin with, we dene environmental
technological leadership as the state whereby a given country has the most environmen-
tally friendly technology among all countries. Thus, we refer to a country that has a
lower i as an environmentally leading country. A country with a higher i is called an
environmentally lagging country. Without loss of generality, we assume A < B holds
in period 0 (initial period); A(0) < B(0): Country A is initially an environmentally
leading country.
4.1 Learning by Doing and Technological Progress
In order to incorporate the basic idea that environmental regulations induce environmen-
tally friendly technological progress (Newell et al. (1999) and Popp (2002)), we consider
the learning by doing setting à la Arrow (1962) and Romer (1986);11 however, if we
thought of a more general and realistic setting as in Youngs (1991) bounded learning by
doing model, our main result would not change qualitatively. We believe that using such
a simple setting is benecial for us to elaborate our main story.
The key assumption is that a country that reduces more pollutants learns how to
produce in a more environmentally friendly manner. Specically, we suppose that the
pollution level of a technology in country i in period t+1; i(t+1); is determined by the
cumulative stock of past experiences on reducing pollutants:
i(t+ 1) = i  
tX
s=0
( i (s)i(s)Yi(s)); (11)
where  i (s)i(s)Yi(s) is the pollution reduction made by country i in period s and 
is a learning-by-doing function that maps the pollution reduction country i does in a
period, s; to how much country i will learn to produce environmentally friendly from
its experience on reducing pollutants. i denotes an initial (period 0) pollution level in
country i, which is exogenously given.
We put two natural assumptions on the learning-by-doing function . (a) (0) = 0;
there is no advance in a country if there is no reduction. (b) (z0) > (z) for z0 > z for
any z; z0 > 0; a country that reduces more pollutants learns more on how to produce
in an environmentally friendly manner. It can be easily veried that, in equilibrium,
11See also Furukawa (2007) for learning by doing in an innovation-based growth model, which is
considered in much the same fashion as Arrows original paper.
8
 i (s)i(s)Yi(s) monotonically increases with 

i (s), which plays a key role in showing the
following lemma.
Lemma 1 The international environmental friendliness (A(t); B(t)) have seven dif-
ferent phases as shown in Figure 2.12
Proof. For the sake of explanation, by (11), we can derive the following expression in
terms of a ow:
i(t+ 1)  i(t) =  ( i (t)i(t)Yi(t)): (12)
Together with Figure 1, (12) implies that there are three typical patterns of the direction
in which (A(t); B(t)) moves over time, depending on the international pair of pollution
reduction rates ( A(t); 

B(t)):
First, in the region of ( A(t); 

B(t)) = (0; 0), there are no technological advances by
assumption (a). Here (A(t); B(t)) never moves and is stable. Second, in the regions
of ( A(t); 

B(t)) = (pA; 0) and (1; 0) ((

A(t); 

B(t)) = (0; pB) and (0; 1)), only country A
(B) engages in the abatement activity. Therefore, only A(t) (B(t)) decreases over time
by assumption (a). This fact is indicated by the left arrow (down arrow) within those
regions. Third, in the region of ( A(t); 

B(t)) = (1; qB) ((

A(t); 

B(t)) = (qA; 1)), both
countries make the environmental investment. As the pollution reduction rate in country
A (B) is higher, i.e.,  A(t) > 

B(t) (

A(t) < 

B(t)), the pollution level in country A (B),
i.e., A(t) (B(t)), decreases more sharply than the pollution level in country B (A),
i.e., B(t) (A(t)) through learning by doing. This comes from the assumption (b) and
the equilibrium property that  i (s)i(s)Yi(s) monotonically increases with 

i (s): This is
indicated by the long left arrow and the shorter down arrow for the region of (1; qB) and
the long down arrow and the shorter left arrow for the region of (qA; 1). All seven phases
are characterized, proving the lemma.
By means of the phase diagram in Figure 2, we can determine the direction in which
international environmental friendliness, (A(t); B(t)); advances over time and roughly
trace a path for any initial point. A typical trajectory, starting from point K0; is illus-
trated by dotted arrows in Figure 2.
4.2 Environmental Leadership
Take an example path starting from K0 in Figure 2, in which A(0) < B(0): Along an
equilibrium path from K0; as can be shown by using the phase diagram, environmental
leadership may shift between the two countries. At rst, country A is the leader with
lower A(t) and it retains its environmental leadership in the subsequent periods 1   4:
Along the equilibrium path, the environmental leadership internationally shifts in period
5; country B becomes a new environmental leader.
We can formally identify this possibility of environmental leaderships shift. Recall
that by (9) and Figure 1, the equilibrium environmental policy pair is ( A(0); 

B(0)) =
(0; 0); (0; pB(0)) ; (0; 1); or (qA(0); 1): Dene a new threshold value ~ such that 2~ =
1=("L (1 + ~)): See Figure 3. If an initial point exists in the blue region in Figure 3 (a),
12In Figure 2, A(t) (B(t)) is measured along the horizontal (vertical) axis, and the time index t is
omitted for simplicity.
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like point k0; the environmental friendliness pair (A(t); B(t)) will eventually fall below
the 45 degree line. The blue region is characterized by
B(0) > A(0) 2 (~; ^): (13)
See Figure 3 (b), in which the red region corresponds to
B(0) > A(0)  ^: (14)
If the pair (A(t); B(t)) exists such as k00 in the red region in Figure 3 (b), it may
eventually either fall below the 45 degree line or move to the blue region of (13). This is
guaranteed by assuming that the extent of technological progress that takes place within
a period is not too large, i.e., there exists some  > 0 such that (; t) < .13 Given this
assumption, if (14) holds, we can show that environmental leadership will eventually shift
internationally.
Taking into account (13) and (14) with Theorem 1, we have the following.
Proposition 1 The environmental leadership of a country may be temporary. Suppose
A(0) < B(0): If the extent of technological progress taking place within a period is not
too large, so long as
A(0) > ~; (15)
the environmental leadership initially retained by country A will eventually shift to the
initial lagging country B:
To explain why such a reversal of environmental leadership can take place under (15),
let us review our result on a step-by-step basis. Initially, country A is an environmentally
leading country with A(0) < B(0): As the environmentally lagging country B is more
polluting, it requires domestic rms to reduce pollutants more by setting a higher rate
of pollution reduction, i.e.,  B(0) > 

A(0) (Theorem 1). Recall that this does not nec-
essarily imply the lagging country B taking a stricter environmental regulation because
it can generate a larger amount of pollution emissions. Through the learning-by-doing
process, the lagging country Bs technology thus becomes environmentally friendly more
rapidly than the leading country As technology does. If the technology of the leading
country A were initially environmentally friendly enough to satisfy A(0) < ~, the world
economy would get to the equilibrium without any pollution reduction ( i (t) = 0). How-
ever, as the leading country As technology is initially not very environmentally friendly
(A(0) > ~), the lagging countrys friendliness continues to increase until it exceeds the
leading countrys. Therefore, if (15) holds, the environmental leadership eventually shifts
internationally.
In a nutshell, the environmentally lagging country may learn to produce in an environ-
mentally friendly way faster than the leading country since the lagging country reduces
more pollution emissions by setting a higher pollution reduction rate, which enhances
learning by doing. This creates a possibility of the shift of environmental leadership
between countries.
What happens after that? The answer to this question is that the leadership shift
may occur once again. See Figure 2, in which K5 moves horizontally in the subsequent
13If a step of technological progress was very large, (A(t); B(t)) might immediately jump into the
grey region of (0; 0).
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period 6. Imagine that K5 crosses the 45 degree line, so the technological leadership
shifts internationally again in period 6: However, in the long run, the world economys
friendliness pair (A(t); B(t)) eventually converges to the grey region in Figure 2, in
which ( A(t); 

B(t)) = (0; 0) and (A(t); B(t)) stays constant.
Denote by (A; 

B) the point that (A(t); B(t)) nally reaches in the grey region.
Whether A > 

B or 

A < 

B is not determinate, depending in a complex fashion on the
initial friendliness levels (A(0); B(0)): That is, which country ultimately becomes an
environmentally leading country is indeterminate. This indeterminacy essentially comes
from the symmetry between the countries (which di¤er only in i(t)). In any case, our
message here is that the environmental leadership retained by a country at some point
of time might be intrinsically impermanent.
Our theoretical result seems consistent with empirical observations. A transition
of the key variable in our model, i(t), which indicates the amount of emissions form
producing one unit of a good (environmental friendliness of technology) in country i,
may correspond to that of CO2 emissions per 1 US dollar (USD) GDP adjusted by PPP,
provided that composition of economic activity is constant in the country. According
to the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) Indicators of the United Nations, many
countries including developed and emerging economies reduced their CO2 emissions per 1
USD GDP (PPP) since the 1990s.14 For instance, emissions per 1 USD GDP in 1991 were
0.430kg in Germany and 0.325kg in Japan but those in 2010 were 0.272kg in Germany
and 0.297kg in Japan.15 Emissions per 1 USD GDP in Poland were 1.176kg in 1990
and 0.479kg in 2010, while those in Bulgaria were 1.155kg in 1990 and 0.515kg in 2010.
Emissions per 1 USD GDP in 1992 were 1.730kg in China and 1.408kg in Russia, while
those in 2000 were 1.011kg in China and 1.237kg in Russia. The values are reversed again
between them because in 2010, they were 0.908kg in China and 0.863kg in Russia. Thus,
our result might explain that a country with initially high emissions per 1 USD GDP
(PPP) reduces the emissions signicantly compared with other countries with initially
low emissions per 1 USD GDP (PPP). Although this explanation is not more than just
a suggestive interpretation of our result, one would think that our analysis on a path of
(A(t); B(t)) is relevant to one of the well known indicators (the MDG indicators).
4.3 Which Country Prevails? The Role of Country Heterogene-
ity
So long as countries are essentially identical, in the analysis above, which country prevails
is not determined. A fundamental question arises as to which country becomes the
ultimate environmental leader in the long run. In this subsection, we will give an answer
to this question by allowing for country heterogeneity.
Suppose that one country is relatively aware of environmental quality, say country
A; and the other has a large amount of e¤ective labor (i.e., population times their labor
productivity), say country B: Denote as Li and "i the e¤ective labor and environmental
awareness of country i, where i = A, B: Then, "A  "B and LA  LB: Equilibrium
optimal policies are shown in Figure 4. (See Appendix B for mathematical details.)
Figure 4 (a), by setting "A = "B and LA < LB; shows how the di¤erence in in-
ternational e¤ective labor sizes a¤ects the equilibrium policies. Dene ^i such that
14See http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mdg/SeriesDetail.aspx?srid=788.
15In the United Kingdom, emissions per 1 USD GDP were 0.443kg in 1991 and 0.242kg in 2010.
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^i = 1=("iLi (1 + ^i)): Because ^B is lower than ^A in this case, the stable region (0; 0)
is twisted with a rightward bias. In fact, as LB increases, ^B decreases and ^A increases.
Therefore, when country Bs e¤ective labor LB is very large, A > B (where coun-
try B is the leader) holds almost everywhere in the stable region (0; 0): Given that the
world economy eventually moves into the stable region (0; 0), we can say that a county
with large e¤ective labor is more likely to eventually obtain the environmental leadership
(A > B).
Remark 1 A country that has a large amount of e¤ective labor tends to eventually be-
come an environmental leader in the long run.
The implication of Remark 1 is as follows. A large amount of e¤ective labor im-
plies huge potential pollution emissions. Thus, the government of country B tends to
implement a higher rate of pollution reduction for a longer time that promotes the tech-
nological progress as a by-product in the long-term. Therefore, given its large e¤ective
labor, country B may tend to obtain environmental leadership eventually, even if it is
initially an environmentally lagging country.
Heterogeneity of environmental awareness, "A > "B; determines which country nally
retains the environmental leadership. See Figure 4 (b), with the denition of  where
2(1+)  1="A; which means  = ("A) with 0("A) < 0: Starting from any point in the
red-box region (where B(t) <  and B(t) < A(t)); B(t) < A(t) holds in the long run.
Outside the red-box region, any path eventually converges to a state with B(t) > A(t);
where country A is the leading country. As, by 0("A) < 0; the red-box region becomes
smaller as "A increases, we have the following statement.
Remark 2 A country that has greater awareness of environmental quality tends to be-
come an environmental leader in the long run.
The implication of Remark 2 is straightforward. Given its greater environmental
awareness "A; country A is more likely to adopt a higher pollution reduction rate, abating
more emissions. It follows that the learning-by-doing e¤ect works more actively in country
A, which would advance environmental technology in country A faster (decreasing A(t)
faster than B(t)).
5 Global Pollution
In this section, we investigate how global pollution changes over time. In doing so, we
assume that the two countries di¤er only in their technological friendliness in the initial
period; A(0) < B(0). Using (5), (9), and (10), we will elaborate how global pollution,
E(t) = EA(t) + EB(t); changes over time in each stage of environmental development.
Stage I: Consider an earlier stage of environmental technology development, in which
both countries set a positive rate of pollution reduction, ( A(t); 

B(t)) = (qA(t); 1) : As
shown in the phase diagram in Figure 2, environmental technology advances in both
countries; both A(t) and B(t) decreases over time. By (5), (9), and (10), we have
E(t) =
1
2" (1 + A(t))
 e1A(t) as 1"L(1+A(t)) < A(t) : (16)
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We nd that, during this early stage (stage I), global pollution increases as environmental
technologies in the leading country advance. That is, E(t) increases as A(t) decreases.
Stage II: The second stage is with ( A(t); 

B(t)) = (0; 1) ; where technological
progress takes place only for the lagging country. Only B(t) decreases over time. Global
emissions in this case can be calculated as
E(t) =
A(t)L
2
 e2A(t) as 1"L(1+B(t)) < A(t) < 1"L(1+A(t)) : (17)
While the leading country generates a constant amount of pollution, the lagging country
reduces all of its pollution emissions. Therefore, it is clear that global pollution is kept
constant. That is, E(t) never changes while B(t) decreases over time.
A fundamental question is whether global pollution rises or declines in the period
of regime switching from stages I to II. The answer is not clear and global pollution
depends on the extent of technological progress that takes place within that period.
Suppose that regime switching from stages I to II occurs from periods t to t + 1. If the
extent of technological progress in the leading country, i.e., A(t); is reasonably large,
global pollution is reduced with this regime switching, E(t+ 1) < E(t).16
Stage III: In a more advanced stage of environmental technology development with
( A(t); 

B(t)) = (0; pB(t)) ; as in stage II, only B(t) decreases over time. We can obtain
E(t) =
1
2" (1 + B(t))
 e3A(t) as A(t) < 1"L(1+B(t)) < A(t) + B(t) ; (18)
global emissions start to increase again. In a regime switch from stages II to III, global
pollution necessarily increases.17
Stage IV: Finally, if both countries have a su¢ ciently clean technology such that if
A(t) + B(t) <
1
"L(1+B(t))
, they do not need pollution reduction; ( A(t); 

B(t)) = (0; 0) :
In this case, global pollution is given by
E(t) =
(A(t) + B(t))L
2
 e4(t) as A(t) + B(t) < 1"L(1+B(t)) : (19)
This implies that global pollution emissions become constant in the long-run steady state
(i.e., in stage IV), given that A(t) and B(t) are constant due to ( A(t); 

B(t)) = (0; 0) :
In a regime switch from stages III to IV, using a simple numerical example, we can show
that global emissions are reduced if technological progress for the lagging country, B(t);
is reasonably large.
We have shown the following proposition from the above analysis.
Proposition 2 The global pollution E(t) may uctuate over time in the process of envi-
ronmental technological progress but nally converges to the constant level in the long-run
steady state.
Proposition 2 shows that the level of global pollution emissions becomes constant in
the long-run. Our theoretical result might be consistent with empirical observations. Ac-
cording to the International Energy Agency (IEA), global energy-related CO2 emissions
16To verify this, consider a numerical example with L = 0:5 and " = 0:5: Assume (A(t); B(t)) =
(1:75; 4:5) and (A(t+ 1); B(t+ 1)) = (1; 3:5) : Then, regime switching occurs from t to t + 1; noting
(16) and (17). Furthermore, E(t) = 0:36364 declines to E(t+ 1) = 0:25:
17Suppose that the world goes from stages II to III in periods t+ 1 to t+ 2: By (17) and (18), noting
A(t+ 1) = A(t+ 2) in stage II, we can easily verify E(t+ 1) < E(t+ 2).
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were at in 2014-2016 although the world economy grew for that period.18 Energy is
an indispensable input for production and emissions from the energy sector is one of the
primary sources of greenhouse gas emissions. It reports that at emissions came from ex-
panding renewable power generation, shifting from coal to natural gas, and improvements
in energy e¢ ciency, because of technological progress and environmental policies. In our
model, production of the good will increase over time because environmental technology
advances through learning-by-doing e¤ects and we can save labor for abatement activity
and use more labor for production. Although this explanation is a suggestive interpreta-
tion of our result, our analysis on the long-run level of global pollution emissions may be
relevant to at CO2 emissions from the global energy sector.
However, whether the long-run level of global pollution emissions is lower than the
initial level is not clear in general; it can be either higher or lower potentially. We will
think of two typical numerical examples;19 see Appendix C for details.
Figure 5 (a) illustrates the rst example (a).20 In this case, the reversal of environ-
mental leadership does not take place, and global emissions uctuates and eventually
increases up to the level higher than the initial level. This implies that the level of global
pollution E(t) may increase over time, despite the fact that environmental technology
monotonically advances in both countries.
The intuition behind the result is as follows. Changes in pollution can be decomposed
into two fundamental forces: scale and technique e¤ects. As shown in Grossman and
Krueger (1993), the scale e¤ect measures the increase in pollution that would be gener-
ated if the economy was simply scaled up, holding all else constant; the technique e¤ect
captures reduction in pollution caused by a fall in emissions intensity, holding all else
constant. In our model, a higher pollution reduction rate in the early stage of environ-
mental technology development, accompanied by a larger amount of pollution reduction,
induces rapid technological progress (through learning by doing), which reduces pollu-
tion (the technique e¤ect). As technological progress enables a country to employ more
labor in production of the good, which causes an increase in pollution (the scale e¤ect).
Example (a) suggests that the scale e¤ect in some cases may play a dominant role, where
environmental technology advances, but emissions also increase.21
Figure 5 (b) describes the second example (b).22 In this example, the environmental
leadership shifts between countries, where global pollution uctuates at rst, but nally
declines to the lowest level. This implies that the long-run amount of global pollution
can be lower than the initial amount. This is essentially because, in our model, the
technology in the lagging country advances more rapidly than that in the leading country.
Technologies in the two countries advance considerably and similarly if both countries
experience the state of a lagging country for more periods. This implies that technological
progress may be more balanced between the two countries as an international reversal of
environmental leadership occurs more frequently.
18See https://www.iea.org/newsroom/news/2017/march/iea-nds-co2-emissions-at-for-third-
straight-year-even-as-global-economy-grew.html.
19In both examples, we set " = L = 0:5 and take (A(t  1); B(t  1)) = (2:5; 7:5) as an initial state.
20We consider the following specic learning-by-doing function: (i(t); k(t)) = (2; 0:75) if 

i (t) >
k(t) > 0 and (2; 0) if 

i (t) > 

k(t) = 0; which is consistent with assumptions (a) and (b).
21Given that the scale e¤ect dominates, an increase in global pollution over time implies that production
increases over time. We can easily verify that in terms of utility, the increase in the output dominates
the increase in pollution.
22We consider the following learning-by-doing function: (i(t); k(t)) = (1; 0:3) if 

i (t) > 

k(t) > 0
and (1; 0) if i (t) > 

k(t) = 0; which is consistent with assumptions (a) and (b).
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Remark 3 The long-run level of global pollution emissions can be either lower or higher
than the initial level. In equilibrium where the environmental leadership shifts interna-
tionally (does not shift internationally), the long-run global pollution emissions may tend
to be lower (higher) than their initial level.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we constructed a simple two-country model with global pollution and
technological progress induced by learning by doing. We characterized the structure of
equilibria and the environmental policies that achieve technological progress. Long-term
global emissions and the dynamic path of environmental friendliness are related to the
initial environmental friendliness, environmental awareness, and learning process between
countries. Our ndings underscore the importance of considering the implications of
technological progress in a multicountry framework.
We have built a simple general equilibrium model to shed some light on the issue of
environmental regulations and their e¤ects on the learning by doing process and global
emissions. It is certainly worthwhile to build alternative models to more deeply under-
stand the mechanism in our paper. The following are in particular worth mentioning
and have been left for future research. First, our analysis does not consider dynamic
optimization because we treat pollution as a ow to derive clear-cut results. However, it
is interesting to investigate the issue when pollution is a stock variable. Second, techno-
logical progress might be reinforced if the national government considers not only nega-
tive externalities caused by pollution, but also positive externalities of learning-by-doing.
Third, the channel for knowledge growth could be by R&D investments as well as learning
by doing. Last, there is no terms-of-trade e¤ect because we have used a one-good model.
Environmental regulations are a¤ected by terms-of-trade e¤ects, which could change the
long-term pace of technological progress.
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Appendix A
We will show the derivations for (9). Assume i > j: By substituting ( i ; 

i ) = (ei; 0)
and ( A; 

B) = (1; ej) into (6) and (7), we have
ei =
"L  1
i

1
1+i
  "Lj

"L+

1
1+i
  "Lj
 (A1)
and
ej =
"L  1
j
1
1+j
"L+ 1
1+j
; (A2)
respectively. With (A1) and (A2), noting 0  ei  1 and 0  ej  1 would imply (9),
given the denitions of pi and qi:
Appendix B
We will show the derivations for Figure 4 (the case with heterogeneous countries).
The reaction function becomes
 i (

j) =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 if "i  11+i

iLi +
j(1 j)
1+jj
Lj
 1
ei otherwise
1 if "i  11+i

j(1 j)
1+jj
Lj
 1 ; (B1)
where
ei =
"iLi   1i

1
1+i
  j(1 

j)
1+jj
"iLj

"iLi +

1
1+i
  j(1 

j)
1+jj
"iLj
 : (B2)
Dene ^i such that ^i  1"iLi(1+^i) : Then, using (B1) and (B2), the equilibrium policy
pair goes to
( i ; 

j) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
(0; 0) if ALA + BLB  mini2fA;Bg
n
1
"i(1+i)
o
(pi; 0) if
min
n
"i
"j

i +
"i "j
"i

; 1
"iLj(1+i)
o
> j  1"iLj(1+i)   i LiLj
(1; 0) if ^j > j > 1"iLj(1+i)
(1; qj) if "i"j

i +
"i "j
"i

> j  ^j
; (B3)
where
pi =
"iLi  1i

1
1+i
 j"iLj

"iLi+

1
1+i
 j"iLj
 and qi = "iLi  1i 11+i"iLi+ 11+i : (B4)
It is straightforward to illustrate Figure 4 by using the above equilibrium conditions.
Appendix C
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We will explain numerical calculations for Remark 3 in detail. In both examples,
we think of (A(t  1); B(t  1)) = (2:5; 7:5) as an initial point, which ensures stage I
for country A as a leading country, noting (16). Set " = L = 0:5: Then, we calculate
E(t  1) = 1
1+2:5
' 0:28571:
Example (a): Technological progress follows (i(t); k(t)) = (2; 0:75) if 

i (t) > 

k(t) >
0 with (2; 0) if  i (t) > 

k(t) = 0; which is consistent with the learning rules that we
assume.
As (A(t  1); B(t  1)) = (2:5; 7:5) ; the world is in stage I by (16), and E(t  
1) = 1
1+2:5
' 0:28571: Given the values of i(t) assumed, it goes to (A(t); B(t)) =
(1:75; 5:5) : By (16), the world is also in stage I and we have E(t) = 1
1+1:75
' 0:36364:
In the subsequent period t+ 1; it becomes (A(t+ 1); B(t+ 1)) = (1; 3:5) : Noting (17),
the world shifts to stage II in period t + 1: We can calculate E(t + 1) = 0:25: Next,
(A(t+ 2); B(t+ 2)) = (1; 1:5) satises the inequality condition in (18), so it is in stage
III and E(t+ 2) = 1
1+1:5
= 0:4: Finally, it goes to (A(t+ 3); B(t+ 3)) = (1; 0:5) ; which
satises (19). In period t + 3; the world moves to the terminal stage IV and we can
calculate E(t+3) = 1:5
4
= 0:375;which is higher than the initial level E(t  1) ' 0:28571:
Example (b): Technological progress follows (i(t); k(t)) = (1; 0:3) if 

i (t) > 

k(t) >
0 and (1; 0) if  i (t) > 

k(t) = 0; which is consistent with the learning rules that we
assume.
Through the assumed process of technological progress, stage I continues in pe-
riods t to t + 2: (A(t); B(t)) = (2:2; 6:5) ; (A(t+ 1); B(t+ 1)) = (1:9; 5:5) ; and
(A(t+ 2); B(t+ 2)) = (1:6; 4:5) while E(t) = 11+2:2 ' 0:3125; E(t + 1) = 11+1:9 '
0:34483; and E(t + 2) = 1
1+1:6
' 0:38462: In periods t + 3 and t + 4; it goes to (1:3; 3:5)
and then (1:3; 2:5) ; in which case the world is in stage II noting (17). Then, E(t+ 3) =
E(t + 4) = 1:3
4
= 0:325: Next, (A(t+ 5); B(t+ 5)) = (1:3; 1:5) ; which satises (18).
It is stage III and E(t + 5) = 1
1+1:5
= 0:4: In period t + 6; it goes to (1:3; 0:5) ; in
which country B is a new leading country. An analogous inequality to that in (18),
B(t) <
1
"L(1+A(t))
< A(t) + B(t); is satised, so that the world is in stage III,
E(t + 6) = 1
1+1:3
= 0:43478: Finally, it goes to (A(t+ 7); B(t+ 7)) = (0:3; 0:5); in
which the leadership internationally shifts again. Country A regains the leadership and
it satises (19), stage IV. Then, we calculate E(t + 7) = 0:8
4
= 0:2; which is lower than
the initial level E(t  1) ' 0:28571
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Figure 1: Seven regions of equilibrium policy on a             plane BA κκ −
Figure 2: Phase diagram 
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Figure 3(b): Environmental leapfrogging 
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Figure 5 (a): Global pollution without environmental leapfrogging  
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